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Abstract 
This paper presents evidence on the labor market effects of social assistance 
programs in the short and medium run. We evaluate the impacts of a 
Conditional Cash Transfer program (Familias en Acción) on informality in 
Colombia. We exploit an exogenous shock linked to cash transfer benefits that 
the government provides to poor people to evaluate the effect of these benefits 
on informality. We argue that being a beneficiary of social programs may 
create perverse incentives that drive people towards informality through a 
substitution effect. Survey data of “Familias en Acción” program was used to 
identify whether the program had any effect on workers’ labor decisions 
concerning participation (or the lack thereof) in the informal labor market in 
Colombia after one and four years after its implementation. We apply matching 
algorithms and difference-in-differences estimations to evaluate the effect of 
the program. We find that a worker’s informality condition may be affected by 
receiving CCT income and by the structure of the colombian health system.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Different aspects of informality have been studied in the literature, ranging from its definition 
(Fields, 2011; Levy, 2008; Maloney, 2004; Tokman, 2001; De Soto, 1986, Sethuraman, 1981) to 
its impact on different areas of the economy, such as reduced public revenues (Turnovsky and 
Basher, 2009; García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2005)), earnings inequality (Rosser, et al., 1999; 
Ernste and Schneider, 1998) and social policy (Ahmad and Best, 2012; Anton et al., 2011; Levy, 
2008; Levy, 2007).  
 
Many studies analyze informality from an exclusionary perspective by considering that it is 
imposed on workers because of labor market segmentation (Rauch, 1991; De Soto, 1989; Harris 
and Todaro, 1970). In contrast to this position, we argue that informality might be a worker’s 
choice instead of an imposition (“exit” perspective). Moreover, in line with Levy (2007) and 
Levy (2008), we believe that informality can also be understood as a result of optimizing 
decisions that every worker undertakes when he/she has the opportunity to work. 
 
We applied this “exit” perspective to examine Colombia’s situation because, over recent 
decades, the country has reported high levels of informality relative to the rest of Latin America. 
Studies such as Lopez and Lasso (2012)1, Betranou et al. (2009), World Bank (2008) and Uribe 
and Ortiz (2000)2 report high informality rates in Colombia since the 1980s. Additionally, Botero 
(2011) and Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007) find an upward sloping tendency in informality in 
this country during the 2000s3.  
 
Due to this situation, the colombian government has made important efforts to reduce 
informality. In 1993, a substantial change was implemented through Law 1990 that divided the 
                                                            
1 Lopez & Lasso (2012) used information on the working-age population from household surveys of Colombia’s 
seven capital cities. Their study shows that informal employment (non-salaried with low education level) did not 
experiment meaningful change between 1984 and 1996 (around 17%), increased due to the Colombian financial 
crisis at the end of the century (21% highest record), decreased between 2003 and 2007 (18% lowest record) and 
increased again from 2008 to 2011 (around 22% highest record).  
2 Uribe & Ortiz (2000), using information of the Household National Survey, mention that from the economically 
active population of the ten most important areas in Colombia, 50.1% were informal workers in 1998, 48.91% were 
informal workers in 1992, 48.45% were informal workers in 1994, 47.7% were informal workers in 1996, 47.69% 
were informal workers in 1998, and 48.88% were informal workers in 2000.   
3 Schneider (2012) presents data on Colombia’s informality (or shadow economy) measured as a percentage of the 
official GDP from 1999 to 2010, showing a downward slopping tendency. Nevertheless, the average during that 
period was 37.7%. It is important to note that informality measurements depend on the definition applied. 
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health system into subsidized and contributive systems; formal workers would participate in the 
contributive one, and their employers would pay a percentage of their health and pension 
contributions 4 . Subsequently, in 2010, Law 1429 5  was enacted for the explicit purpose of 
reducing firm informality by granting incentives, such as reduced payroll taxes (conditional on 
hiring vulnerable workers) and reduced formal registration fees6, to small enterprises to become 
formal. However, informality remains high, as 51.2% of the employed population belongs to this 
labor sector according to DANE (2013)7.  
 
In an effort to seek an explanation for the persistence of informality in Colombia from the “exit” 
perspective, we focused on the benefits that the government provides to the poor for social 
protection (social protection programs) as a possible source. As theoretical and empirical 
evidence demonstrates (Urdinola et al., 2009; Gasparini et al., 2006; and Barros, 2006), being a 
beneficiary of social programs may create perverse incentives. This study highlights those 
perverse incentives affecting a worker’s labor market sector decision based on Levy (2008). 
 
To achieve our objectives, we employed evaluation data on the “Familias en Acción” program, 
which allowed us to identify (because of its structure) whether the program had any effect on 
workers’ labor decisions regarding participation in the informal labor market in Colombia. To 
accomplish this objective, we applied quasi-experimental estimation techniques (propensity 
score matching and difference-in-differences estimations) using three different informality 
definitions. Our results indicate that Familias en Acción program generally increases informality 
in Colombia.  
 
This first section of the article provides a brief overview of the analysis. A review of the 
“Familias en Acción” program is presented in section two, while section three assesses different 
definitions of informality. In section four, we present a literature review that concerns topics 
related to informality, social protection and conditional cash transfer programs. In section five, 
we describe the characteristics of our data and develop our main assumptions. Section six 
                                                            
4 The contribution percentages were modified in later years. 
5 Ley 1429 de Formalización y Generación de Empleo 
6 According to Confecamaras (2011), until August 2011, 231.566 enterprises benefited from this law.  
7 The most recent information available is in DANE (2013), based on the GEIH survey - Quarter 4/2012 (October - 
December) for 13 metropolitan areas in Colombia. 
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describes the methodologies used to accomplish the impact evaluation and the results of the 
estimation. Finally, in section seven, we discuss the results and provide some conclusions. 
 
2. FAMILIAS EN ACCIÓN 
Familias en Acción (FA) is a social protection program in the form of a Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT). It has been applied by the Colombian government as part of the Red de 
Protección Social – RPS (Social Support Network) since 2001 with financial support from the 
World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank. RPS is a public temporary social safety 
net that was created in 1999 with the aim of alleviating the effects of an economic recession and 
fiscal policy adjustments on extremely vulnerable populations in Colombia. 
The primary objectives of FA were to safeguard and foster human capital formation among 
children aged 0 to 17 from poor households through two different subsidies. The first (health and 
nutrition) was provided to the household on the conditions that children aged below 7 were 
vaccinated and attended health and nutritional check-ups and that mothers attended informational 
presentations on health. The second subsidy (education) was provided to children between 7 and 
17 who were enrolled in school and attended no less than 80% of classes during the school year. 
The eligibility criteria were determined by a proxy-means testing instrument called the System 
for Identification and Selection of Social Spending Beneficiaries (SISBEN in Spanish), which 
classifies households into categories according to their characteristics, such as income, education 
level, and the materials used in home construction, among others. As Castañeda (2005) notes, the 
application of SISBEN combines geographical targeting and family assessments to determine 
eligibility for a number of benefits provided by all levels of government. For a household to 
classify as an FA beneficiary, it must be registered as SISBEN-1, which according to Baez and 
Camacho (2011a) represents approximately the poorest 20% of the country’s population. 
The selection of municipalities covered by FA was based on specific characteristics, such as 
having fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, preferably being located in rural areas, having at least 
one financial institution, not being the capital of a regional district, having the infrastructure 
necessary for health and education services, and not being located in the Coffee Region area that 
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received special assistance as a consequence of the 1995 earthquake (IFS-Econometría S.A., 
2004). 
To determine the impact of the program, an initial assessment was conducted in 2004, and a 
second was conducted in 2006. According to official reports (IFS-Econometría S.A., 2004 and 
DPN, 2008), the general conclusion (of both evaluations) is that the program effectively 
achieved its objectives, as it increased public expenditures on education, had positive effects 
regarding growth patterns among rural children and the weight of urban children, and reduced 
the levels of extreme poverty in rural areas, among others8.  
 
3. INFORMALITY 
3.1. Defining Informality  
Defining informality is a difficult task; moreover, given the wide variety of concepts used to 
describe its meaning and evolution, it would be difficult to combine them into a single concept. 
However, some characteristics agreed on by most definitions are that informality involves 
economic activities that are not officially measured or registered, the work is generally labor 
intensive, workers learn skills while working, and entry and exit are easier than in the formal 
sector. Nevertheless, the most widespread definition of the informal sector is that proposed by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) based on the Fifteenth International Conference of 
Labor Statisticians, which describes it as “…[a group] of units engaged in the production of 
goods or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the 
persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level of organization, with little or no 
division between labor and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labor relations -
where they exist- are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social 
relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees”. 
 
The perpetuation and expansion of informality has been attributed to the limited capacity of the 
formal private sector to generate adequate employment and incomes (Charmes, 1998; 
Sethuraman, 1997 and Tokman, 1990; quoted in Blunch et al., 2001). However, some studies, 
                                                            
8 There  are  also  studies  that  analyze  the  impact  of  FA  on  areas  other  than  those  for which  the  program was 
created, such as intra‐household time allocation (Ospina, 2010) and voters’ behavior (Nupia, 2011). 
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such as Maloney (2004) argues, the informal sector should be considered an unregulated sector, 
analogous to the voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced countries, rather 
than a residual composed of disadvantaged workers rationed out of good jobs. 
 
In any event, as mentioned in Andrews et al. (2011), “In practice, the definition [of informality] 
that is most useful depends on the policy concern that motivates the analysis and data 
availability”9. Based on that, we will define informality using a social protection criterion and 
focusing on a worker’s employment characteristics. This definition will lead us to a basic and 
intuitive classification that divides workers into salaried or non-salaried workers; nevertheless, 
the complexity of labor markets in Colombia, as in many countries in Latin America and the 
world, demands a more disaggregated classification within each group. 
 
Given the remarks above, we followed Levy’s (2008) proposal that goes beyond the salaried and 
non-salaried framework and explains formality/informality as a result of the intersection of the 
scope of a regulation’s application (social security) and its enforcement. Additionally, we 
included Gasparini and Tornarolli’s (2007) perspective that classifies informality according to 
legality10 (worker’s labor protection and social security) and productivity (a worker’s skills, firm 
size and a worker’s income). Finally, from a legalistic perspective, we incorporated some 
distinctive attributes of the Colombian informal sector, such as enrollment in the Subsidized 
Health System.  
 
From a social security perspective, the salaried worker can be considered informal if he or she is 
not enrolled in social security by the hiring firm. While this is illegal, firm owners occasionally 
negotiate directly with future employees to exchange their social security contributions for a 
higher salary or “under the table” bonuses. Thus, we are uncertain whether this illegal activity 
(that implies a lack of social security benefits) is voluntary or compulsory. A reasonable hint to 
identify this type of informality is the firm’s size; frequently, small firms’ owners declare 
themselves as self-employed to avoid paying their workers social security. Additionally, it is 
                                                            
9 Contrary  to  this,  Fields  (2011)  remarks  that  using  terms  such  as  “informality”,  “informal work”  or  “informal 
economy”, as they are code words that mean different things to different people, impedes communication rather 
than enhancing it. 
10 As mentioned  in Levy  (2008), hiring  salaried workers but not enrolling  them  in  social  security  is an  illegal act 
committed by the firm, not by the worker. 
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very difficult for regulatory institutions to track this irregularity. De Soto (1989) explains this 
relationship as follows, “higher levels of government rent-seeking or bureaucratic obstacles to 
legal firm entry will lead to a greater bifurcation of firm sizes; very small informal firms and 
large formal firms”. Moreover, Charlot et al. (2011) assert that for developing countries, “firms 
in the informal sector are generally smaller and more numerous compared to those in the formal 
sector”. For this reason, an “informal worker” will be defined as any person who works for a 
firm that has fewer than five employees11.  
 
From a productivity perspective, the ILO considers informal sector work to be primarily labor 
intensive and requiring low-level skills; moreover, workers expand their skills on the job. This 
suggests that a non-salaried and unskilled worker could be characterized as informal. As non-
salaried workers do not make social security contributions, regulation becomes irrelevant. 
Workers with low skills (expressed as a low education level) are assumed to have low incomes 
and will also have less of an opportunity to compensate for the lack of social security with 
private services because of income constraints. Therefore, we will assume that non-salaried 
workers with low skills tend to be informal.  
 
From a legalistic perspective, it must be noted that health services are compulsory in Colombia. 
Thus, we will use the two participation options a worker has in the General System of Health 
Services as a defining factor of formality/informality status. According to Law N° 100, passed 
on December 23rd, 1993, all Colombian residents must be affiliated with the General System of 
Health Services; thus, workers must be enrolled by their employers in the contributive health 
system, and individuals who lack employment contracts or sufficient economic resources to 
participate through their own means must be enrolled by the government (subsidized health 
system). If a worker is enrolled in the Contributive Health System, this implies that, at some 
point, he/she has been recognized as a “formal” worker by his/her employer. Moreover, we 
assume there are some payments (payroll discounts) incurred by the worker to receive health 
services. However, workers enrolled in the Subsidized Health System do not have an 
employment contract and do not make any payments to receive health services; this is why a 
                                                            
11 We took in DANE’s criteria to specify informal firms’ size. 
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person who declares to be working but receives subsidized health services from the government 
can be considered “informal”. 
 
3.2.Informality in Colombia  
As mentioned above, informality can be understood in many ways; however, most developing 
countries follow the ILO’s precepts as a guideline, and Latin America is no exception. 
Nevertheless, most of the existing literature on this group of countries has used the criterion of a 
worker having access to social security benefits as the definition of informality (Perry et al., 
2007; Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2006; Rofman and Luchetti, 2006 and World Bank, 2008).   
 
Colombia’s statistical office (DANE) follows ILO and PREALC12 regarding informality criteria 
and classifies those who are currently employed by a firm with fewer than five employees and 
those who do not receive any salary for their work (family or other businesses) as informal13.  
 
With respect to the evolution of informality in Colombia, over the last two decades, the country 
belonged to the group with higher informality rates relative to the rest of Latin America, along 
with Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru14  (Gasparini and 
Tornarolli, 2006). These high levels of informality have affected growth in the country; 
moreover, from a global perspective, informality in Colombia is approximately 20 percentage 
points above what would be expected, given its GDP per capita (World Bank, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Programa Regional de Empleo para América Latina y El Caribe – PREALC. 
13 Guataqui et al. (2011) present a comprehensive study of the components and features of informality in Colombia.  
14 According to Gasparini & Tornarolli (2006), Colombia’s share of informal labor has been close to 60 percent over 
the past 10 years.   
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Figure 1: Informality in Colombia (in percentages) 
 
 
 
Sources: Data from DANE, EIH and GEIH 
Notes: The informality data provided by DANE were extracted from two different surveys. The 
first contains information from January 2001 until June 2006 called ECH (Continuous Household 
Survey), and the second contains information from July 2006 until the present, called GEIH 
(Household Integrated Survey). 
Information for the period 2001 – 2006 is only available from April – June of each year. Therefore, 
to obtain a single harmonized series, information from 2007 until 2011 also corresponds to the 
second quarter of each year. 
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As can be observed in Figure 1, informal workers in Colombia represent an important share of 
the actively employed population (approximately 50%). Nevertheless, between 2003 and 2008, 
Colombia’s economy was recovering from a recession that, combined with active labor market 
policies against informality, resulted in a downward sloping trend in informality (with the 
exception of 2009).  
Informality has consistently been a component of the Colombian government’s agenda because 
of its persistence over time and its negative effects. As Perry et al. (2007) note, informality 
affects workers’ welfare, firm productivity and growth, and fiscal sustainability.  
With respect to the structure of the Colombian informal labor force (Figure 2), it can be observed 
that most of these workers declared themselves to be self-employed (over 60%), which according 
to Bernal (2007) can be defined as those who own their own firms but do not have any paid 
employees.  
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Figure 2 Informal Labor Force by Job Types (in percentages) 
 
 
Source: Data from DANE - GEIH 
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A number of key socioeconomic factors common among informal workers in Colombia are 
highlighted by the World Bank (2008). These factors include greater participation of men in the 
informal sector, similar distributions of women and men in the informal labor force by job type, 
age ranges where there is a greater incidence of informality (from 15 – 18 years and 45 and 
above) and a higher likelihood that young people will begin their working lives as informal 
workers. 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Informality can be understood from different perspectives, but the “exit” and “exclusion” 
perspectives seem to be the most appropriate to explain the connection between informality and 
social protection, as these perspectives consider the different relationships between the state and 
economic agents. As Perry et al. (2007) note, the “exclusion” of workers from the benefits 
provided by the government, which can be considered involuntary informality, occurs due to 
labor market segmentation, burdensome entry regulations for small firms (De Soto, 1989), and 
excessive tax and regulatory burdens for large firms. Conversely, the “exit” perspective, based 
on Hirschman (1970), holds that workers, firms and families make their informality decision 
based on implicit cost-benefit analyses that incorporate the quality of the state’s service 
provision and its enforcement capacity. 
 
4.1.Social Policy and Informality 
We will focus on the “exit” perspective, which allows 15  workers to consider their current 
situation when deciding whether to participate in the informal labor market. Some of the reasons 
that workers might choose informality are related to their perceptions of their own skills16 and 
the high mobility that informal workers may have (Hirschman, 1970). 
 
Unskilled workers who partially pay for social protection (formal workers with low skills) 
directly and implicitly pay for this protection through lower formal wages, and they may find 
                                                            
15 The “exclusion” perspective can be considered an imposition because it does not give economic agents any 
chance of making decisions regarding their situation. However, the “exit” (meaning “leaving without trying to fix 
things”, according to Hirschman (1970)), introduces informality as an option that workers choose based on cost-
benefit analyses.  
16 This justifies including the perspective advanced by Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007) when defining informality. 
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that what they expected to obtain in the formal jobs for which they are qualified does not 
outweigh the forgone current consumption or greater flexibility and earnings they may obtain as 
informal workers. This is especially true when they have social protection alternatives through 
access to universal or noncontributory programs or through private means. Larger firms or 
skilled professionals may decide to underreport their operations and incomes, balancing private 
gains from tax evasion with the low detection risks resulting from poor enforcement (Perry et al., 
2007). 
 
Based on these considerations, we will follow Levy (2008), which is based on the assumption 
that labor markets in Latin America are not segmented17; hence, as in De Soto (1987) and 
Hirschman (1970), this perspective considers that informality might be the result of workers’ 
decisions. Levy’s (2008) main contribution is the inclusion of social protection as a determinant 
of informality18 and argues that social policy induces informality for four different reasons: 1) 
non-salaried workers are excluded from social security; 2) social security functions like a tax on 
salaried labor; 3) social protection functions like a subsidy to non-salaried labor; and 4) firms 
and workers in salaried relationships engage in illegal behavior by generating illegal (informal) 
salaried labor.  
These four conclusions are extracted from the theoretical model presented in Levy (2008) and 
Levy (2007), which permits us to analyze labor market dynamics while including social security 
and social protection benefits.  
 
We must assume that an agent who works in the formal sector (formal worker) recognizes 
benefits such as pensions or social security that are prepaid by the hiring firm. Although an 
informal worker does not obtain those benefits, the government provides him/her other benefits 
(usually from social protection programs) that are not related to his/her personal characteristics.  
This is precisely the situation we analyzed, where social protection incentivizes workers to be 
informal. 
 
                                                            
17 Perry et al. (2007) concluded that most countries in Latin America (including Colombia) present weak evidence 
for labor market segmentation. 
18 As mentioned above, Levy’s (2008) definition of formality/informality is based on the results on the intersection 
of the scope of a regulation’s application (social security, health or other) and its enforcement.  
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4.2.Previous Evidence 
Several prior studies analyze the influence of social assistance programs on workers’ choice of 
employment sectors around the globe. For Mexico, Levy (2008) suggests that non-targeted social 
assistance programs may increase informality. Barros (2006), also for Mexico, analyzes the 
impact of “Seguro Popular” (subsidized health services for informal workers), finding no 
meaningful evidence of increased informality due to the social assistance program. Galiani and 
Gertler (2010) find that “70 y más”, a non-contributory Mexican pension program, increases 
informal employment among elderly people.  
 
For Argentina, Gasparini et al. (2006) find that the “Jefes de Hogar” program (cash transfers to 
unemployed household heads), disincentives participants from searching for a formal job. 
Urdinola et al. (2009) evaluate the “Green Card” program (a non-contributory health system for 
the informal sector) in Turkey and fail to detect any impact of the program (or its rapid 
expansion) on informality.  
 
Specifically for Colombia, we found a single study (Camacho et al., 2010) that evaluates the 
Colombian government's expansion of publicly provided health services and finds robust and 
consistent estimates of an increase in informal employment (between 2 and 5 percentage points) 
after the expansion. 
 
5. DATA  
To apply the theoretical framework developed by Levy (2007) and Levy (2008) and to examine 
the incentives that social protection generates regarding informality in Colombia, we employ 
data from the FA program. We selected this database because its structure allows us to 
confidently apply quasi-experimental techniques; moreover, there is no similar dataset for any 
social program in Colombia with the magnitude of FA19. 
 
In general terms, the FA database includes information from three different surveys: a baseline 
dataset collected in 2002, an initial follow up completed in 2003, and a second follow up 
                                                            
19 Familias en Acción was the first large-scale evaluation of a social intervention implemented in Colombia (Briceño 
et al., 2011). 
15 
 
conducted between 2005 and 2006. This information is publicly available and can be 
disaggregated by household and by individual. To compare the impact of FA over time, we 
constructed two subsamples; the first matches the baseline survey to the first follow up, and the 
second combines the baseline survey with the second follow up. These subsamples allow us to 
explain the evolution of informality given social protection in the short and medium/long run. 
 
Due to the labor market characteristics provided in the survey, we define workers as those who 
reported spending most of their time working the week prior to the survey or reported having a 
job (although they were not working at that time). To exclude child labor, only workers aged 
fifteen years and over were considered (according to Colombian Law N° 515 of 1999). 
Moreover, due to data collection issues, some municipalities received FA payments before the 
baseline survey was conducted. This situation caused some data contamination; therefore, only 
information from municipalities where the baseline survey was applied before FA cash transfers 
were given was included. Finally, in the second follow up survey, some families that belonged to 
the control group began receiving FA subsidies. These families were not included in the 
estimations because their transition from the control to the treatment group caused distortions 
when characterizing each group during the matching process.  
 
 
Regarding our definition of informality, as noted in previous sections, we understand informality 
from a broad perspective and use it in three different ways:  
 
Informality type 1 (Inf1): Informal workers are those who are not enrolled in social security by 
the hiring firm: Assuming that small firms do not pay workers’ social security benefits (only in 
this definition), we can safely argue that people working in firms with fewer than five employees 
can be considered informal workers.  
Informality type 2 (Inf2): Informal workers are those workers who are unskilled and do not 
receive a salary: We follow the productive perspective advanced by Gasparini and Tornarolli 
(2007) to define informality by including non-salaried workers’ skills in our conceptualization. 
16 
 
Due to data constraints, we used non-salaried workers’ education levels as a proxy20. As the 
target population of FA are SISBEN 1 families (poor people with low education levels and 
economic limitations), we considered those non-salaried workers who completed high school and 
above to be “skilled”. 
 
Informality type 3 (Inf3): Informal workers are those enrolled in the Subsidized Health System: 
With the aim of accounting for Colombia’s particular characteristics in our conceptualization, we 
decided to use enrollment in the Subsidized Health System as the criterion to define informality. 
If a worker is enrolled in this system, we assume that he/she prefers to be informal and to 
continue receiving public health services for free rather than making any contributions to obtain 
similar private health services as a formal worker. Therefore, if a worker is enrolled in the 
Subsidized Health System, he/she will be considered informal.  
 
 
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
6.1. Causal effects: Identification and Estimation 
Based on the theoretical framework of Levy (2007) and Levy (2008), we assessed the impacts 
that social assistance may have on informality. To this end, we used quasi-experimental 
estimation techniques to evaluate the FA program’s impact on informality in Colombia. 
 
Certain considerations, such as differences in covariate values between informal and non-
informal workers, demand special attention during the evaluation procedure. Moreover, the non-
random assignment of municipalities to the treatment (FA beneficiaries) or control groups may 
lead to imbalances across the covariates 21 . To avoid biased estimates of the impacts of 
informality in naïve comparisons of informal and non-informal workers, we applied propensity 
score matching to control for this confounding imbalance. 
 
                                                            
20 We decided  to use a proxy because  it would be almost  impossible  for us  to measure workers’  skills properly 
(including hard and soft skills) based on the available data. 
21 FA program is targeted at poorest people (SISBEN‐1) therefore individuals self‐select into the program. 
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Through propensity score matching, we obtained the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT22), which tells us whether workers who are FA beneficiaries would have chosen being 
informal had they not received FA assistance. Nevertheless, this procedure requires a 
counterfactual to compare with the obtained results; thus, we estimated it23 by calculating each 
worker's propensity to be informal using a representation of his his/her decision through a 
logistic regression of the binary category treatment/control and then matching these workers with 
other workers with similar propensities. Every decision is based on a function of the individual’s 
observed characteristics (covariates or confounders) summarized in a propensity score24. 
 
As in a randomized experiment, matching techniques balance covariate distributions between 
treated and non-treated individuals as an identification strategy25. Treatment (ܶ) is assigned 
independent of potential outcomes ܻሺ݅ሻ, where ݅ ൌ 1 for informal workers and ݅ ൌ 0 for non-
informal workers. Therefore, we expect similar average outcomes if both groups receive the 
same treatment or if none of them do, which can be represented by the following equations: 
 
ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ|ܶ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ܧሾܻሺ1ሻሿ (1)  
ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ܧሾܻሺ0ሻሿ (2) 
 
These equations show that the average potential outcome for the treatment group under treatment 
is equal to the average potential outcome of the control group, had it been treated (equation 1), 
and that the average potential outcome for the treated group, had it not been treated, is equal to 
the average potential outcome of the control group with no treatment (equation 2). 
 
                                                            
22 We decided to use ATT instead of ATE because as Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) note, in order to estimate ATE, 
we would have to construct not only the counterfactual of treated had they not been treated (as in ATT), but also a 
counterfactual of the non treated had they been treated.  
23 According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it is not possible to know each individual’s propensity because that 
would imply having complete information about selection; therefore, these propensities have to be estimated. 
24 By summarizing each individual’s characteristics, propensity score matching solves the “curse of dimensionality” 
that covariate matching would have because of continuous and/or numerous confounders. 
25 The core framework that the propensity score matching method employs attempts to reproduce that of randomized 
experiments. Nevertheless, as Lee (2006) mentions, it is important to note two important differences between 
propensity score matching and randomized experiments. First, propensity score matching only balances the 
observables between treated and control samples, while randomized experiments balance the distributions of  both 
observables and unobservables. Second, the estimates from propensity score matching can be considered a weighted 
average of the estimates from many small randomized experiments. 
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Based on this, the ATT is estimated using the following equation, where ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ 
represents the counterfactual: 
ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ܧሾܻሺ01ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ െ ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ (3) 
 
However, the estimation of the ATT would only be correct if treatment were assigned randomly, 
thus making the outcomes independent. Unfortunately, this was not the case because FA 
beneficiaries were selected based on specific characteristics; as a consequence, we will use the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) that ensures that the distributions of key covariates 
are balanced across the treatment and control groups26. 
 
At this point, we have specified our identification strategy (propensity matching score); however, 
there are many matching metrics available to achieve our goals. The best matching metric is the 
one that provides the best balance across our covariates of interest; this is the “nearest neighbor”. 
This metric considers each treated (control) unit and searches for a control (treated) unit with the 
closest propensity score. Then, this metric matches each unit with the closest one with respect to 
the propensity score. We used the variation in this metric that includes replacement, which 
means that an untreated individual can be used more than once as a match for treated units27. 
 
 Difference-in-differences and Matching  
We combined propensity score matching (PSM) with double-difference or difference-in-
differences estimation (DiD) to address the potential for unobserved heterogeneity because DiD 
method allows the program selection to be based on unobserved variables28. As Khandker et al. 
(2010) note, by jointly applying these techniques, we can address the nonrandom program 
placement which might bias the program’s effect, besides getting a better match control and 
project units on preprogram characteristics. 
 
                                                            
26 We have two main assumptions: 1) The set of characteristics we have chosen includes all relevant differences 
between the treatment and control groups. 2) The distribution of the characteristics in the control group we selected 
most resembles the distribution of the treatment group.  
27 By allowing replacement in the nearest neighbor technique, we reduce bias and increase average matching quality. 
Nevertheless, this also increases the variance of the ATT estimators. 
28 Nevertheless, the DiD method requires that unobserved variables be time-invariant. 
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This estimator (DiD) compares a before-after estimation of treated individuals with a before-after 
estimation of non-treated individuals. This means, as mentioned in Bryson et al. (2002), that the 
DiD estimator can cope with macroeconomic changes or changes in the lifecycle socio-economic 
status, as long as those changes affect both participants and non-participants similarly. 
 
The equation for the DiD estimator is as follows: 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଷ ௧ܲ ൅ ߚସሺܶ ∗ ܲሻ௜௧ ൅ ߝ  (4) 
 
Where ܻ represents the outcome, ܶ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the observation is in 
the treatment group or 0 if it is in the control group. ܲ represents a post-treatment dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the data are from a follow up or 0 if the data correspond to the baseline. 
 
6.2. Estimation and Results 
As mentioned above, we performed all estimations using two different data subsets; the first 
includes information from the baseline and the initial follow up, and the second includes 
information from the baseline and the second follow up. Therefore, all results are presented for 
both data subsets in parallel. 
 
As a first step, we made a naïve comparison between the treatment and control groups as a 
reference for further propensity score matching and DiD estimations. To estimate this naïve 
difference-in-differences estimator, we used the following equation, which was originally 
proposed by Ñopo et al. (2002) and modified for our purposes: 
 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ	ܨܣ	݋ݒ݁ݎ	݂݅݊ܺ
ൌ ൣ൫ሺ݂݅݊ܺ|ܶ ൌ 1ሻ	݂ܽݐ݁ݎ	ܨܣ൯ െ ൫ሺ݂݅݊ܺ|ܶ ൌ 1ሻ	ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁	ܨܣ൯൧
െ ൣ൫ሺ݂݅݊ܺ|ܶ ൌ 0ሻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ	ܨܣ൯ െ ൫ሺ݂݅݊ܺ|ܶ ൌ 0ሻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܨܣ൯൧ 
           (5) 
The impact that FA has on each type of informality is the proportion of total beneficiaries 
(treatment group) of the number obtained as a result of equation 5. These calculations are 
reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Naïve DiD estimator: 
 
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow up 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
S.E. Standard Error 
 
 
Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow up 
Informality 
type Coef S,E, T-Stat pvalue 95% Conf, Interval 
inf1 -0,5711% 0,0064 -0,9000 0,3700 -0,0182 0,0068 
inf2 2,6581% 0,0076 3,5100 0,0000 0,0117 0,0414 
inf3 0,7881% 0,0092 0,8600 0,3890 -0,0101 0,0258 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
S.E. Standard Error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informality 
type Coeficient S.E. T-Stat pvalue 95% Conf. Interval 
inf1 -0,3582% 0,0061 -0,5900 0,5560 -0,0155 0,0083 
inf2 -0,6160% 0,0066 -0,9300 0,3500 -0,0191 0,0068 
inf3 -3,7263% 0,0082 -4,5200 0,0000 -0,0534 -0,0211 
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As can be observed in the table, the impact that FA has on informality in data subset BF (short 
run) is even because all the informality types get reduced. However, when we consider the BS 
(long run) subset, we observe an uneven behavior, inf1 decreases in 0.5% while inf2 and inf3 
increase. Clearly, these naïve comparisons and estimators do not consider the features of the 
informality types included or the structure of the treatment and control groups (most of the 
regressions are not statistically significant); therefore, to make this information truly comparable, 
we applied the propensity score matching technique and difference-in differences estimation in 
the next step.  
 
The covariates used in the logistic regression and their descriptions are specified in Appendix 1. 
Although the differences are minimal, each definition of informality required a different equation 
for each data subset (BF and BS) that was constructed from a set of covariates and then used as 
input to perform propensity score matching and the difference-in-differences estimations. 
 
In addition to the proper selection of covariates for each equation, there are other latent issues we 
must address, such as the effectiveness of our matching procedure and the reduction of bias. 
Therefore, we must focus on how well balanced our covariates are; as D’Agostino and Rubin 
(2000) note, the propensity scores only serve as devices to balance the observed distribution of 
covariates across treated and comparison groups. Thus, the success of the propensity score 
estimation is assessed on the basis of this balance rather than by the fit of the models used to 
create the estimated propensity score. 
 
Another aspect to consider is the assumption of common support. As noted above, PSM 
estimation performs under this assumption, which implies that all individuals who lack a match 
or were poorly matched will be omitted from the ATT estimation. Therefore, we look for a 
sample with high levels of “on support” observations because the larger the sample from which 
the impact of FA was estimated, the more relevant and representative the results. 
 
Given these considerations, we performed PSM using the psmatch2 Stata routine developed by 
Leuvin and Sianesi (2003). We applied the nearest-neighbor metric with replacement and 
included Cochrane and Rubin (1973) caliper matching, which allowed us to define a tolerance 
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level when comparing propensity scores (we set the caliper tolerance at 0.01)29. The PSM results 
obtained are reported in Table 2.  
 
The complementary estimations that include different tolerance levels are presented in Appendix 
2; they give evidence of robustness since the results are not seriously affected despite different 
calipers. Similarly, in Appendix 3 we present the results obtained with different algorithms such 
as Radius Matching, Kernel Matching and NNMatch with the aim of showing that nearest 
neighbor algorithm not only presented the best balance, but also, the specification was 
statistically significative for all cases. Finally in Appendix 4 we present heterogeneity test for 
each equation30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 An issue with caliper matching is the difficulty in setting the tolerance level a priori (Smith & Todd, 2005). 
Therefore, we performed several estimations with different caliper levels; our results (balance and common support) 
were not particularly sensitive to these variations, and hence, we decided to set the caliper at 0.01, as in most impact 
evaluation studies.  
30 As can be seen in Appendix 4 there is some evidence of heterogeneity in our estimations. 
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Table 2: Propensity Score Matching Results 
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow up 
Informality 
type Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat 
Support 
(%) 
inf1 
Unmatched 0,1574 0,1600 -0,26% 0,0061 -0,4200  
ATT 0,1573 0,1373 2,00% 0,0082 2,4500 99,9657 ** 
inf2 
Unmatched 0,1877 0,1949 -0,72% 0,0066 -1,0900  
ATT 0,1876 0,2061 -1,85% 0,0092 -2,0000 99,9828 ** 
inf3 
Unmatched 0,5445 0,5818 -3,73% 0,0083 -4,4900  
ATT 0,5445 0,5852 -4,06% 0,0115 -3,5200 99,9657 *** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
S.E. Standard Error 
 
Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow up 
Informality 
type Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat 
Support 
(%) 
inf1 
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,45% 0,0064 -0,7000  
ATT 0,1386 0,1200 1,86% 0,0085 2,1900 99,9508 ** 
inf2 
Unmatched 0,2277 0,2026 2,51% 0,0076 3,3  
ATT 0,2276 0,2053 2,22% 0,0102 2,19 99,9672 ** 
inf3 
Unmatched 0,5483 0,5402 0,81% 0,0092 0,8800  
ATT 0,5484 0,5225 2,59% 0,0126 2,0500 99,9179 ** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
S.E. Standard Error 
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In the short run (data subset BF), the FA program’s impact on informality is negative for 
informality types 2 and 3. However, in the medium/long run (data subset BS), we obtain 
preliminary positive results from the ATT estimations for all informality types. This finding 
could be broadly interpreted as the FA program encouraging informality when workers make 
their labor sector decisions. Nevertheless, the PSM results cannot be directly interpreted, as we 
are only using them as a component of the DiD estimation process31 
 
Finally, as Heckman et al. (1997) suggest, we performed a DiD estimation that includes PSM 
specifications and results, as the effectiveness of the DiD estimator depends essentially on the 
characteristics of unobserved variables that could affect informality. The procedure of DiD 
estimation is performed only over the “on support” part of the sample after the PSM procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
31 The PSM results are a fair approximation of the program’s impact, but to correct for potential unobservable 
differences between the treatment and control groups that may affect the outcome (informality), we conducted a DiD 
estimation based on the PSM results. 
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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Results 
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow up 
Informality
type Impact S.E. 
inf1 -3,8675% 0,0097 
inf2 2,5041% 0,0096 
inf3 -0,4880% 0,0118 
      Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow up 
Informality
type Impact S.E. 
inf1 -1,2901% 0,0104 
inf2 4,9000% 0,0109 
inf3 7,3636% 0,0130 
      Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 3 presents estimates of the impact on each type of informality besides the standard errors.  
In the short run (data subset BF), Type 1 informality decreased by 3,86%, demonstrating that the 
FA program might disincentive beneficiaries to work in small enterprises. Regarding inf2, there 
is a 2,50% increase. Finally, inf3 decreased by 0,488%, implying that some beneficiaries in the 
short run prefer to be part of the contributive health system. 
 
In the medium/long run (represented by the data subset Bs), the FA program has a positive effect 
on informality types 2 and 3. On the other hand, Type 1 informality decreased by 1,29% due to 
program participation, which implies a decrease in the number of FA program beneficiaries 
working in enterprises with fewer than five employees. Regarding non-salaried and unskilled 
workers, informality (inf2) increased by 4,9% keeping the trend observed in the short run; this 
can be interpreted as a self-entrepreneurial attitude of workers that has been strengthened by the 
fact that the CCT acts as a financial safety net that allows them to make more risky decisions 
such as being informal. 
 
Finally, the enrollment of workers in the Subsidized Health System increased 7,36%. In the short 
run we observed a small decrease in informality (workers started to contribute), but in the 
medium/long run workers change their minds and rather being enrolled in the subsidized health 
system. This might happened because they realize that by keeping their SISBEN status they can 
have access not only to a subsidized health system, but also to CCTs money. Therefore, by being 
informal they earn money by working (without making any contribution), have access to health 
services for free and also receive extra money from FA subsidies.  
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper examines the effect of social protection programs on a broad definition of labor 
market informality. Social protection programs, such as conditional cash transfers, are known to 
be a powerful tool to combat inequality and increase welfare in a society. However, CCTs may 
have significant side effects, especially on health, education and the labor market. Positive 
income shocks may create incentives for workers to move out of the labor market but may also 
act as a cushion, driving workers towards risky ventures such as informality.   
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The social protection program “Familas en Acción” was developed as a social safety net for 
Colombia’s poorest people after the economic crisis the country suffered during the 1990s. The 
results this program delivered to its target population (children and teenagers) were positive, 
such as increasing school enrollment, reducing childhood malnutrition and even discouraging 
child labor supply (Attanasio et al., 2006).  
 
We examine the causal effect of social assistance programs on worker informality using Familias 
en Acción (FA). To this end, we computed several matching algorithms and employed nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching with a caliper and a difference-in-differences estimation for 
three different definitions of informality. We extend the existing literature on CCT and 
informality by considering informality from a broader perspective and by using three different 
definitions of informality. In addition, we exploit several key features of our dataset to examine 
the short and medium run effects.  
 
Overall, we found that the effect that Familias en Accion had over the number of workers in 
small firms (inf1) was a contraction. In the short run, the decrease was around 3,86% while in the 
medium/long run was 1,29 %.  
 
About unskilled workers (inf2), FA fostered informality. In the short run informality increased in 
2,50% and almost doubled in the medium/long run (4,90%). We speculate that this reflects 
workers making risky decisions (starting their own businesses) because they use FA a financial 
back up for investment. Also FA money could be used as the initial investment to start an 
informal business. 
 
Finally, about workers enrolled in the Subsidized Health System, in the short run it had a small 
negative impact (0,488%). Nevertheless, in the medium/long run, the effects of FA fostering 
informality are higher (7,36%) which could be interpreted as the awareness of workers about the 
benefits of being informal (no contributions,  health services for free and extra money from FA). 
However, the results for the short and medium/long run effects present heterogeneity. 
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These findings suggest that social protection programs may had a small impact on the structure 
of the labor market, but also show at some extent how monetary incentives can distort their labor 
decisions. 
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Appendix 1: List of Covariates 
Type Variable  Description 
name 
  
  
  
  
Continuous  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
age Age 
agesq Age squared 
edumax Maximum education acquired 
expe Years of experience 
inc income 
incsq income squared 
children Number of children under 6 years 
youth Number of people form 7 to 17 years 
elderly Number of people over 60 in the household 
nmemb Total number of persons who live in the household 
ch_labor Number of children working in the household 
youth_labor Number of young workers in the household 
eldelrly_labor Number of elderly people who work 
hh_age Household head age 
chdeath Number of children death in the household 
wap Number of working age people in the household 
fwap Number of femal working age people in the household 
rooms Number of rooms in the house 
nmemb Total number of persons who live in the household 
  twojobs Secondary activity dummy: 1 if the worker has two jobs 
  married Marital Status dummy: 1 if the worker has a permanent couple (married or free union) 
  write Dummy: 1 if the worker is able to write 
  head Head of household dummy:  1 if the worker is head of household or head of household's spouse 
  hh_married Dummy: 1 if the head of household is married 
  hh_falone Dummy: 1 if the head of household is female and has no couple 
  hh_fem Dummy: 1 if the head of household is female 
  unem Dummy: 1 if the worker was unemployed the last year 
  migrate Dummy: 1 if some household member migrated 
  read Dummy: 1 if the worker is able to read 
Dummy illiterate Dummy: 1 if the worker is unable to read and write 
  sav Dummy: 1 if any household member has savings in a financial institution 
  debt Dummy: 1 if any household member has debts 
  sex Sex dummy: 1 men, 0 women 
  own Dummy: 1 if some household member owns the house 
  elementary Dummy: 1 if the worker finished elementary school 
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  high Dummy: 1 if the worker finished high school 
  college Dummy: 1 if the worker finished college 
  urban Dummy: 1 urban, 0 rural 
  extra Extra Income dummy: 1 if the worker perceived any extra income besides his/her main activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Appendix 2: Sensitivity to proximity (calipers) 
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow up 
Inf1 
Caliper Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
0.01 
Unmatched 0,1574 0,1600 -0,0026 0,0061 -0,42  
ATT 0,1573 0,1373 0,0200 0,0082 2,45 99,965677 ** 
0.001 
Unmatched 0,1574 0,1600 -0,0026 0,0061 -0,42  
ATT 0,1577 0,1371 0,0206 0,0082 2,52 99,588124 ** 
0.0001 
Unmatched 0,1574 0,1600 -0,0026 0,0061 -0,42  
ATT 0,1593 0,1359 0,0233 0,0083 2,82 93,753218 *** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
  
Inf2 
Caliper 
Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
  
0.01 
Unmatched 0,1877 0,1949 -0,0072 0,0066 -1,09  
ATT 0,1876 0,2061 -0,0185 0,0092 -2 99,9828 ** 
0.001 
Unmatched 0,1877 0,1949 -0,0072 0,0066 -1,09  
ATT 0,1879 0,2068 -0,0189 0,0092 -2,05 99,5538 ** 
0.0001 
Unmatched 0,1877 0,1949 -0,0072 0,0066 -1,09  
ATT 0,1887 0,2100 -0,0213 0,0093 -2,29 94,8344 ** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf3 
Caliper Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
0.01 
Unmatched 0,5445 0,5818 -0,0373 0,0083 -4,4900  
ATT 0,5445 0,5852 -0,0406 0,0115 -3,5200 99,9657 *** 
0.001 
Unmatched 0,5445 0,5818 -0,0373 0,0083 -4,4900  
ATT 0,5448 0,5863 -0,0415 0,0115 -3,6000 99,5366 *** 
0.0001 
Unmatched 0,5445 0,5818 -0,0373 0,0083 -4,4900  
ATT 0,5506 0,5876 -0,0370 0,0115 -3,2000 93,4443 *** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
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Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow up 
Inf1 
Caliper Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
0.01 
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000  
ATT 0,1386 0,1200 0,0186 0,0085 2,1900 99,9508 ** 
0.001 
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000  
ATT 0,1387 0,1199 0,0187 0,0085 2,2000 99,4255 ** 
0.0001 
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000  
ATT 0,1407 0,1220 0,0188 0,0086 2,1900 90,5121 ** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf2 
Caliper Sample Treatment Control Difference S,E, T-Stat Support 
0.01 
Unmatched 0,2277 0,2026 0,0251 0,0076 3,3000  
ATT 0,2276 0,2053 0,0222 0,0102 2,1900 99,9672 ** 
0.001 
Unmatched 0,2277 0,2026 0,0251 0,0076 3,3000  
ATT 0,2279 0,2054 0,0225 0,0102 2,2100 99,7045 ** 
0.0001 
Unmatched 0,2277 0,2026 0,0251 0,0076 3,3000  
ATT 0,2272 0,2068 0,0204 0,0102 1,9900 90,5450 ** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf3 
Caliper Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
0.01 
Unmatched 0,5483 0,5402 0,0081 0,0092 0,8800  
ATT 0,5484 0,5225 0,0259 0,0126 2,0500 99,9179 ** 
0.001 
Unmatched 0,5483 0,5402 0,0081 0,0092 0,8800  
ATT 0,5482 0,5233 0,0249 0,0126 1,9800 99,7045 ** 
0.0001 
Unmatched 0,5483 0,5402 0,0081 0,0092 0,8800  
ATT 0,5496 0,5229 0,0267 0,0127 2,1000 89,9869 ** 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
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Appendix 3: Matching algorithms 
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow up 
Inf1 
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
Radius 
Unmatched 0,1574 0,1600 -0,0026 0,0061 -0,4200  
ATT 0,1573 0,1478 0,0094 0,0063 1,4800 99,9657   
Kernel 
Unmatched 0,1574 0,1600 -0,0026 0,0061 -0,4200  
ATT 0,1573 0,1481 0,0091 0,0063 1,4500 99,9657   
    
NNmatch 
inf1_first Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
SATT 0,0045 0,0082 0,5400 0,5890 -0,0117 0,0206 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf2 
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
Radius 
Unmatched 0,1877 0,1949 -0,0072 0,0066 -1,0900  
ATT 0,1876 0,1898 -0,0022 0,0068 -0,3300 99,9828   
Kernel 
Unmatched 0,1877 0,1949 -0,0072 0,0066 -1,0900  
ATT 0,1876 0,1900 -0,0024 0,0067 -0,3600 99,9828   
    
NNmatch 
inf2_first Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
SATT -0,0100 0,0088 -1,1300 0,2570 -0,0272 0,0073 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf3 
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
Radius 
Unmatched 0,5445 0,5818 -0,0373 0,0083 -4,4900  
ATT 0,5445 0,5790 -0,0344 0,0086 -4,0000 99,9657 *** 
Kernel 
Unmatched 0,5445 0,5818 -0,0373 0,0083 -4,4900  
ATT 0,5445 0,5809 -0,0364 0,0085 -4,2600 99,9657 *** 
    
NNmatch 
inf3_first Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
SATT -0,0517 0,0111 -4,6600 0,0000 -0,0734 -0,0299 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
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Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow up 
Inf1 
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
Radius 
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000  
ATT 0,1386 0,1344 0,0043 0,0067 0,6400 99,9508   
Kernel 
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000  
ATT 0,1386 0,1354 0,0032 0,0066 0,4900 99,9672   
    
NNmatch 
inf1_second Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
SATT 0,0084 0,0085 0,9900 0,3230 -0,0082 0,0250 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf2 
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
Radius 
Unmatched 0,2277 0,2026 0,0251 0,0076 3,3000  
ATT 0,2276 0,2014 0,0262 0,0079 3,3300 99,9672 *** 
Kernel 
Unmatched 0,2277 0,2026 0,0251 0,0076 3,3000  
ATT 0,2276 0,2015 0,0261 0,0078 3,3500 99,9672 *** 
    
NNmatch 
inf2_second Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
SATT .022981 .0100367 2.29 0.022 .0033093 .0426526 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
Inf3 
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support 
Radius 
Unmatched 0,5483 0,5402 0,0081 0,0092 0,8800  
ATT 0,5484 0,5320 0,0164 0,0096 1,7100 99,9179 * 
Kernel 
Unmatched 0,5483 0,5402 0,0081 0,0092 0,8800  
ATT 0,5483 0,5331 0,0152 0,0095 1,6000 99,9343   
    
NNmatch 
inf3_second Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
SATT .0180565 .012001 1.50 0.132 -.005465 .041578 
Source: Authors’ calculations  (Statistically significative: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) 
 
39 
 
Appendix 4: Heterogeneity test (Rosenbaum Bonds) 
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow up 
inf1      inf2 inf3  
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-  Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-
1,00 206162,00 206162,00 0,02 0,02  1,00 0,95 0,95 0,17 0,17 1,00 248208,00 248208,00 0,01 0,01 
1,05 130337,00 28209,00 0,10 0,00  1,05 179428,00 0,10 0,04 0,46 1,05 353139,00 143349,00 0,00 0,08 
1,10 0,58 354568,00 0,28 0,00  1,10 260048,00 0,64 0,00 0,26 1,10 453223,00 0,43 0,00 0,33 
1,15 0,05 423934,00 0,48 0,00  1,15 337153,00 141273,00 0,00 0,08 1,15 548918,00 0,47 0,00 0,32 
1,20 0,71 490468,00 0,24 0,00  1,20 411057,00 215002,00 0,00 0,02 1,20 640606,00 138956,00 0,00 0,08 
1,25 134023,00 554414,00 0,09 0,00  1,25 482037,00 285769,00 0,00 0,00 1,25 728623,00 226698,00 0,00 0,01 
1,30 194978,00 615987,00 0,03 0,00  1,30 550331,00 353818,00 0,00 0,00 1,30 813262,00 311023,00 0,00 0,00 
1,35 253677,00 675374,00 0,01 0,00  1,35 616154,00 419367,00 0,00 0,00 1,35 894785,00 392194,00 0,00 0,00 
1,40 310295,00 732743,00 0,00 0,00  1,40 679694,00 482606,00 0,00 0,00 1,40 973422,00 470448,00 0,00 0,00 
1,45 364986,00 788242,00 0,00 0,00  1,45 741117,00 543707,00 0,00 0,00 1,45 104938,00 545995,00 0,00 0,00 
1,50 41789,00 842004,00 0,00 0,00  1,50 800574,00 60282,00 0,00 0,00 1,50 112284,00 619023,00 0,00 0,00 
1,55 469131,00 894147,00 0,00 0,00  1,55 858199,00 660083,00 0,00 0,00 1,55 119398,00 689701,00 0,00 0,00 
1,60 518822,00 94478,00 0,00 0,00  1,60 914114,00 715619,00 0,00 0,00 1,60 126294,00 758182,00 0,00 0,00 
1,65 567064,00 993998,00 0,00 0,00  1,65 968428,00 769539,00 0,00 0,00 1,65 132985,00 824604,00 0,00 0,00 
1,70 613947,00 104189,00 0,00 0,00  1,70 102124,00 821943,00 0,00 0,00 1,70 139485,00 889093,00 0,00 0,00 
1,75 659555,00 108854,00 0,00 0,00  1,75 107264,00 872924,00 0,00 0,00 1,75 145804,00 951763,00 0,00 0,00 
1,80 703964,00 113401,00 0,00 0,00  1,80 112271,00 922565,00 0,00 0,00 1,80 151953,00 101272,00 0,00 0,00 
1,85 747244,00 117837,00 0,00 0,00  1,85 117153,00 970942,00 0,00 0,00 1,85 157941,00 107206,00 0,00 0,00 
1,90 789457,00 122169,00 0,00 0,00  1,90 121917,00 101813,00 0,00 0,00 1,90 163777,00 112986,00 0,00 0,00 
1,95 830662,00 126402,00 0,00 0,00  1,95 126568,00 106418,00 0,00 0,00 1,95 169469,00 118622,00 0,00 0,00 
2,00 870913,00 130541,00 0,00 0,00  2,00 131113,00 110916,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 175024,00 12412,00 0,00 0,00 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow up 
 
inf1      inf2 inf3  
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-  Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-
1,00 127527,00 127527,00 0,10 0,10  1,00 240288,00 240288,00 0,01 0,01 1,00 14796,00 14796,00 0,07 0,07 
1,05 0,62 193479,00 0,27 0,03  1,05 160544,00 32014,00 0,05 0,00 1,05 0,52 243885,00 0,30 0,01 
1,10 -0,01 256422,00 0,50 0,01  1,10 0,85 396345,00 0,20 0,00 1,10 0,34 33537,00 0,37 0,00 
1,15 0,54 316651,00 0,30 0,00  1,15 0,12 469261,00 0,45 0,00 1,15 121612,00 42283,00 0,11 0,00 
1,20 111226,00 374411,00 0,13 0,00  1,20 0,51 53918,00 0,30 0,00 1,20 205267,00 506617,00 0,02 0,00 
1,25 166378,00 429917,00 0,05 0,00  1,25 118138,00 606357,00 0,12 0,00 1,25 28553,00 587038,00 0,00 0,00 
1,30 219409,00 483356,00 0,01 0,00  1,30 182226,00 671018,00 0,03 0,00 1,30 362672,00 664362,00 0,00 0,00 
1,35 270491,00 534893,00 0,00 0,00  1,35 243928,00 733358,00 0,01 0,00 1,35 436936,00 738829,00 0,00 0,00 
1,40 319774,00 584674,00 0,00 0,00  1,40 303427,00 793555,00 0,00 0,00 1,40 508537,00 810651,00 0,00 0,00 
1,45 367394,00 632828,00 0,00 0,00  1,45 360885,00 851763,00 0,00 0,00 1,45 577664,00 880017,00 0,00 0,00 
1,50 413471,00 679472,00 0,00 0,00  1,50 416448,00 908123,00 0,00 0,00 1,50 644491,00 947097,00 0,00 0,00 
1,55 458111,00 72471,00 0,00 0,00  1,55 470246,00 96276,00 0,00 0,00 1,55 709172,00 101204,00 0,00 0,00 
1,60 501413,00 768636,00 0,00 0,00  1,60 522397,00 101579,00 0,00 0,00 1,60 771845,00 107499,00 0,00 0,00 
1,65 543462,00 811333,00 0,00 0,00  1,65 573006,00 106731,00 0,00 0,00 1,65 832636,00 113607,00 0,00 0,00 
1,70 584339,00 852879,00 0,00 0,00  1,70 622172,00 111741,00 0,00 0,00 1,70 89166,00 119539,00 0,00 0,00 
1,75 624115,00 893343,00 0,00 0,00  1,75 669979,00 116619,00 0,00 0,00 1,75 949022,00 125305,00 0,00 0,00 
1,80 662855,00 932789,00 0,00 0,00  1,80 71651,00 121371,00 0,00 0,00 1,80 100482,00 130916,00 0,00 0,00 
1,85 70062,00 971275,00 0,00 0,00  1,85 761836,00 126005,00 0,00 0,00 1,85 105913,00 136379,00 0,00 0,00 
1,90 737463,00 100885,00 0,00 0,00  1,90 806025,00 130527,00 0,00 0,00 1,90 111204,00 141703,00 0,00 0,00 
1,95 773437,00 104558,00 0,00 0,00  1,95 849138,00 134944,00 0,00 0,00 1,95 116363,00 146894,00 0,00 0,00 
2,00 808585,00 108148,00 0,00 0,00  2,00 891232,00 13926,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 121396,00 15196,00 0,00 0,00 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
